Professor Richard Schlatter, in his Private Property: The History of an Idea, writes, “In the history of the theory of property, it is not what Plato meant, but what men thought he meant that is important” (Schlatter 1951, 11,12). I wholeheartedly concur: I treat all non-living philosophers this way; that is philosophers to whom I cannot send an instant email asking them what they meant.
Theories about private property do not come to us in a vacuum, they are usually based on some first premises, or even other philosophic theories. The first question a theorist must ask is: what is the definition of private property? Does it mean just the “things” people can possess? Or does that also include the land on the surface of the earth? Most often private property is deemed a “right.” But then “rights” are theories that also need first premises, and those first premises are based on theories of human “equality” v. “inequality,” and then all of those theories are divided by the question of “natural” v. “conventional.” Next, theories of property become related to theories of liberty, and finally: theories of property & liberty become premises in theories of distributive justice, which is the whole point of questioning property in the first place.
Plato, the extreme idealist/ rationalist, believed that the “forms” were more real than our common-sense idea of reality; that the general was more real than the particular, so almost all of his premises have to be taken on faith; on his a priori knowledge. I had better put forth my own argument now because it will be coming up again and again as we continue our survey of the literature: No matter what is the basic premise on which we base “natural law,” if that law cannot be enforced, it is meaningless as a working concept. To be enforced, it must become a conventional law, and then it is no longer a natural law. There are two syllogisms in that argument and both my first premises are based on empirical experience, not on either inspiration or validation by the gods.
#1
A law that cannot be enforced is meaningless
Natural law cannot be enforced unless people agree to enforce it
If no people agree to enforce natural law then natural law is meaningless.
#2
A law can be enforced if people agree to enforce it.
When people agree to enforce a law it is, by definition, a conventional law.
A natural law can be enforced when it becomes a conventional law.
The logic I used above for “Law,” also applies to “Rights” and “Equality.” All three terms are rationalist terms, denoting a general or universal category, and all three terms are going to be used in further arguments about property. As an empiricist and nominalist, I am only concerned with particular instances, and even then I have to analyze the differences between the personal constructs of particular philosophers, and the social constructs of particular societies, given a particular time and place.
Ironically, Plato validates my perspective rather than his own. Further on, but still in Book I of The Laws, the Athenian asks Cleinias (who is from Crete), why their laws decree common meals, gymnastics, and the wearing of weapons. Cleinias answers that Crete is not like Thessaly, and continues his explanation, using practical arguments based on empirical observation (Plato2 [360 B.C.E.]). (I have no problem with arguments validated by gods, as long as the gods are empiricists and are using inductive logic, and a posteriori experience.) Next, the subject of “inequality” is brought into the arguments. The inequality discussed in this dialogue concerns different terrains in different countries, but the example of runners and terrains points out the relationship of people to their environments: i.e. bad terrain: poor runners, good terrain: good runners, but more important is Plato’s argument that particular inequalities are due to particular unequal situations, hence the need for different particular laws. As for the question of common meals, Cleinias answers that the legislators took into consideration that the citizens in the fields have to eat together as a protection against common enemies (Plato2 [360 B.C.E.]). Again, a particular law is passed that addresses a particular situation in a particular time and place. Whether it is what Plato meant or not, I am going to argue that all theories about laws, equality, rights, and property should be judged by that criterion, and as we continue our survey of the literature I will show why this is the best philosophic method, for this particular subject.
Many political philosophers, since the ancient Greeks, have described three kinds of governments; monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Plato began this tradition in The Republic, by listing four, but the first, “Timarchy,“ was a special case relating to Sparta, a military dictatorship that Plato somehow differentiated from other forms of tyranny (Plato1 [360 B.C.E.], 359). His “tyranny” would correspond to “monarchy,” as his “oligarchy” would correspond to “aristocracy.” Whether subsequent philosophers have known they were paraphrasing previous philosophers by listing these three forms of government, or actually believed they were presenting original thought is not relevant to this discussion. However, some have even taken the trouble to compare the relative merits of each. Some have chosen one kind or another for the basis of their own political philosophy, others have taken the more pragmatic approach and discussed why each kind may be better suited to a particular time, place and social context.
In The Republic, Plato did not believe in private property for the Guardians, his Philosopher kings (Plato1 [360 B.C.E.], 182-187), but in The Laws he allowed the lower classes to own private property (Plato2 [360 B.C.E.]). Plato, in calling the four traditional forms of government “imperfect societies” (Plato1 [360 B.C.E.], 356), seems to be taking great pains to argue that in his “perfect” society, the Guardians are not an aristocracy or an oligarchy, precisely because they are not wealthy landowners.
I have always wondered why Plato never thought of the concept of “Philosopher Citizens,“ which is my idea of a well educated democracy. The answer, to my mind, is that further reading of The Republic reveals his distain for democracy due to his belief that people are born into their social castes (based on his intuition, not on empirical, scientific fact). While it is true that people are born into specific environments, it is because of this belief system of Plato and other political philosophers with similar prejudices, that most people are prevented, by the political-economic system that follows from that belief system, to ever rise above their original station in life. In other words, for a political philosopher who claims that people are born into their stations, that claim becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Furthermore, his description of his Guardians is not much different from that of those philosophers who advocate rule by a special group of talented and capable men, (as opposed to a one-man monarchy or an all-inclusive democracy), except that Plato was the only philosopher who would not allow his meritocracy to own property.
I will be using the term “oligarchy” from now on to describe rule by a select group of men. The term “aristocracy” is usually used to denote those particular oligarchies that have inherited their titles and/or their land, but all oligarchies, throughout history, have owned land whether their positions were inherited, appointed, or elected. In Plato’s argument against oligarchies he clearly points out that their wealth is what is wrong with their rule (Plato1 [360 B.C.E.], 366). He is the first, but not the last, philosopher to point this out, and subsequent philosophers will use empirical evidence, not divine revelation, to make that case.
Stay tuned tomorrow when we hear what Aristotle had to say on this subject in Part II "Aristotle Studies Political Science".
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